It is well known that rational bubbles can be sustained in balanced growth path of a deterministic economy when the return to capital r is equal to the growth rate g. When there is a lack of stores of value, bubbles can implement an e¢ cient allocation. This paper considers a world where r ‡uctuates over time due to shocks to the marginal productivity of capital. Then, bubbles further e¢ ciency, though they cannot implement …rst best. While bubbles can only be sustained when r = g in a deterministic economy, r > g "on average" in a stochastic economy. Fiscal policy improves welfare by adding an extra asset. Where only the elderly contribute to shifting resources between investment and consumption in a bubbly economy, …scal policy allows part of that burden to be shifted to the young. Contrary to common wisdom, trade in bubbly assets implements inter generational transfers, while …scal policy implements intragenerational transfers. Hence, while bubbles and …scal policy are perfect substitutes in the deterministic economy, …scal policy dominates bubbles in a stochastic economy. For plausible parameter values, a higher degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency should lead to a higher sovereign debt. 1
Introduction
"There is increasing concern that we may be in an era of secular stagnation in which there is insu¢ cient investment demand to absorb all the …nancial savings done by households and corporations, even with interest rates so low as to risk …nancial bubbles." Lawrence Summers, Boston Globe, April 11, 2014 Real interest rates have come down steadily over the past thirty years. This phenomenon has been dubbed secular stagnation, see Richard Baldwin and Coen and IMF (2014, Chapter 3) for an overview of this debate. High precautionary saving in China, lower fertility and the increase in life expectancy have increased the supply of savings. Lower growth, the steady drop in the prices of capital goods, and a shift of economic activity towards IT with a low demand for capital have reduced investment demand. These factors have caused a worldwide decline in real interest rates, which has led to bubbles in asset prices.
This paper addresses the question whether bubbles add to the resilience of the economy. We analyze this problem in a Walrasian world, where all markets are perfectly competitive, where Say's Law always holds and where expectations are rational. We assume that monetary authorities, by some divine touch, are able to avoid the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate. The only missing market is that for intergenerational transfers. Bubbles are shown to partly …ll the gap of this missing market.
Jean Tirole's (1985) celebrated paper on the feasibility of rational bubbles is the starting point of our analysis. A bubbly asset is de…ned as an asset that commands a higher price than the NPV of its expected future dividends. Tirole considers an overlapping generations model similar to that of Peter Diamond (1965) and Olivier Blanchard (1985) . He shows that rational bubbles can be sustained along a balance growth path when the return on capital r is equal to the real growth rate g. Suppose youngsters save a …xed share of their income for future consumption. They can either invest in capital for a return r or buy a bubbly asset to be sold to the next generation. Since saving grows at rate g along a balanced growth path, spending on the bubbly asset grows at a rate g.
When the supply of bubbly assets is …xed, its price therefore increases at a rate g. If r > g, buying bubbly assets would not be a pro…table strategy. If r < g, nobody would invest in capital and its return would go up till either r = g or there is no investment in capital at all. The condition r < g is Peter Diamond's (1965) condition for dynamic ine¢ ciency; r < g is also Henry Aaron's (1966) condition for Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension systems to be more e¢ cient than funded systems. Bubbles are a substitute for PAYG pensions: the young pay the old either by buying their bubbly asset, or by the government taxing them to pay pensions to the old. Though widely di¤erent from a …nancial point of view, both institutions yield the same allocation of resources.
The contribution of this paper is to consider the role of bubbles when r varies over time due to shocks to the marginal productivity of capital, such that the economy jumps back and forth between r = g and r > g. We analyze the potential role of …scal policy in this type of world. In Tirole's balanced growth analysis analysis r is constant over time. Hence, either buying bubbly assets is attractive (r = g), or it is not (r > g). The economy does not have to jump back and forth between both states along a balanced growth path. In an economy with shocks to the return to capital, jumping back and forth between both regimes might be desirable. However, it poses its own problems. The problem is similar to switching back and forth from a funded to a PAYG pension system.
Switching to a PAYG system (such as is attractive when switching from r > g to r = g) is simple, since the stock of savings becomes available for current consumption. Switching back from PAYG to a funded system is hard, since one cohort has to give up consumption to rebuild the capital stock. We show that bubbly assets provide a useful instrument in this context. Suppose that r is temporarily low due to an investment slump. Then, the young do not want to invest all their savings in capital. Instead, they buy the bubbly asset. This raises the price of this asset. Hence, the elderly, who hold these assets, receive a windfall pro…t, which they spend on extra consumption. A reverse mechanism occurs during an investment boom. The variation in the price of the bubbly asset is therefore an instrument for shifting resources between consumption and investment, depending on the return on productive investment, or equivalently, it is an instrument for shifting aggregate consumption over time. Despite the risk of a future capital loss, buying bubbly assets is a rational strategy for the young.
The key contribution of the paper is to show the distinct role of …scal policy in a world with unexpected shocks in the return to capital. In Tirole's balance growth world, bubbles and …scal policy are perfect substitutes. Every additional dollar of sovereign debt reduces the value of the stock of bubbly assets by one dollar. This perfect substitutability no longer holds in an economy with unexpected shocks in r. Shifts between investment and consumption due to variations in r are equivalent to shifts in consumption between generations.
One would expect that such shifts can only be implemented when enforced by the government. However, trade in bubbly assets is shown to be a substitute -albeit imperfect -for transfers enforced by the government. A bubbly equilibrium is therefore more e¢ cient than the naive market equilibrium where all assets are priced according to the NPV of the expected future dividends. However, bubbly assets do not allow the implementation of the …rst-best allocation of resources to consumption and investment (the latter statement is contingent on the exact e¢ ciency concept applied as the wealth of various cohorts has to be aggregated).
Even though bubbly assets are shown to further e¢ ciency by shifting resources from investment to consumption during an investment slump and from consumption to investment during a boom, a simple …scal policy rule is shown to be superior to trade in bubbly assets. The drawback of relying on trade in bubbly assets is that the elderly bear the full cost of adjustment. During an investment slump, the price they get for their holding of bubbly assets is high.
Hence, they can consume more. The reverse holds during a boom. The full burden of the variability of consumption falls therefore on the elderly. Fiscal policy can share this burden between the young and the old. Consider a policy rule where the government commits to issuing a …xed amount of debt every period. It repays the debt from the previous period by receipts of the sale of new bonds this period. During an investment slump, the price of these bonds is high (i.e. the interest-rate is low). Hence, the government runs a surplus on its debt operations. This surplus is distributed among the young in the form of a temporary tax relief. The young save part of this tax relief for consumption during retirement, but another part will be spend on current consumption. The latter part contributes to the shift of resources from investment to consumption.
This mechanism works the other way around during a boom. We enter a strange world in which bubbles implement inter generational transfers without enforcement by the government, while …scal policy is a prerequisite for implementing intragenerational transfers. Fiscal policy can therefore improve welfare. Under quite plausible parameter values, the level of sovereign debt should be set such as to eliminate bubbles entirely and to let sovereign debt absorb all the excess saving that gives rise to the dynamic ine¢ ciency. Hence, no bubbles would emerge in this equilibrium.
We introduce the concepts of ex post and ex ante risk on the return on productive investments. Ex post risk is the standard type of stochastic uncertainty of which the realization is known only after the investment is made. It makes productive investment a risky endeavour. In contrast, the realization of ex ante risk is known at the moment that the investment is made. The part that is unknown is the ex ante risk on tomorrow's investment. This risk does not a¤ect the return on today's productive investments, but it does a¤ect the return on today's purchase of the bubbly asset, because tomorrow's price of the bubbly asset is negatively related to tomorrow's expected return on productive investment, which depends on tomorrow's ex ante risk.
Empirical research done after Tirole (1985) has cast doubt on the practical relevance of his argument. Andrew Abel, Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence Summers and Richard Zeckhauser (1987) showed that for an economy to be dynamically ine¢ cient the capital sector must be a net sink: investment should exceed dividends. They showed that this condition is violated empirically by a wide margin.
However, Francois Geerolf (2013) showed recently that when the criterion for the existence of rents is corrected for some factors (like natural resources), the economy might have been in a dynamic ine¢ cient state frequently. This paper shows that when the economy switches back and forth between r = g and r > g, the capital sector has positive outlays on average. Where Tirole's (1985) analysis yields the conclusion that r = g is a prerequisite for the existence of rational bubbles, this paper leads to the conclusion that bubbles guarantee that r > g "on average".
We extend the analysis one step further by allowing for risk aversion. Then, government debt also acts as an insurance device. Investing in sovereign debt when young o¤ers a generation partial insurance to both the ex ante risk on buying bubbly assets and the ex post risk on investing in capital when they are old. The government charges an insurance premium on issuing these bonds that allows it to run a de…cit "on average". The condition of dynamic ine¢ ciency has been argued not to correspond to what we usually associate with bubbly episodes. These episodes are characterized by high investment driven by waves of optimism, not by low investment, as in Tirole's model. Alberto Martin and Jaume Ventura (2012) analyze a world with distorted …nancial markets where bubbles enable the transfer of wealth from ine¢ cient to e¢ cient investors or where bubbles provide the collateral needed to support these transfers, see their 2014 paper and also Ricardo Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi and Mohamad Hammour (2006) . However, not all bubbly episodes seem to support waves of high investment, consider, for example, the analysis of the hike in oil prices just before the demise of Lehman Brothers in 2008 by Caballero, Farhi, and Pierre Gourinchas (2008) . Manuel Santos and Michael Woodford (1997) worked out in their paper the conditions for the feasibility of rational bubbles. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers the simplest economy that exhibits our mechanism. We use a convenient production function which allows an analytical solution by ruling out complementarity between labour and capital. The young save a …xed amount, which can be stored either in capital or in bubbly assets. The decision on how to store resources is the only margin of adjustment. Section 3 presents the core argument regarding …scal policy. It extends the model of Section 2 by allowing for intertemporal substitution in consumption and by introducing the trade-o¤ for a generation between consumption today and consumption tomorrow. This model has essentially two parameters, the average degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency when all savings are invested in capital and the share of lifetime wealth that is saved for retirement. These parameters characterize the essential mechanisms in our model. The higher the average degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency, the higher must be sovereign debt to absorb excess saving. The lower , the higher the share of the young in lifetime consumption and hence the larger the share of the burden cyclical adjustment in consumption that should be attributed to them. This can be done by …scal policy only. Section 4 relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality. Section 5 concludes.
The basic model 2.1 Core assumptions for all three models
The three models considered in this paper share a common set of assumptions.
We consider an economy that is populated by overlapping generations living for two periods. During each period, a cohort of elderly dies, while a new young cohort enters the economy. In the …rst stage of their life, when young, this cohort works and receives labour income. In the second stage, when old, the cohort is retired and can only consume what is saved from the …rst stage. We apply the maximum convenience principle in modelling. Without loss of generality, we set the rates of population growth and technological progress equal to zero (hence: g = 0). The size of each cohort is normalized to unity. The young have two options for storing resources for consumption in the second stage of life: investing in vineyards or buying the bubbly asset. Their …rst option, to invest in vineyards, we refer to as productive investment. These investments are depleted in one period and yield a physical return. Since investments are fully depleted, investment is equal to the capital stock. Since g = 0, investing is dynamically e¢ cient as long as one unit of investment yields a return of at least one unit of output. Alternatively, they can buy a bubbly asset, which we refer to as gold. Gold can neither be (re)produced nor become depleted. Its supply is normalized to unity. Holding gold does not enter the utility function. Say's law holds in this economy, expectations are rational, and markets clear and are perfectly competitive.
Assumptions for the basic model
In the basic model discussed in this section, the young save one unit of their income for consumption in the second stage of their life. The rest is consumed during the …rst stage. Since the income and the share of saving of the young are …xed by assumption, their consumption is also …xed. Hence, we focus entirely on the consumption of the old. All agents are risk-neutral. Hence, expected consumption of the old is a su¢ cient statistic for the utility of a generation.
Each member of a cohort owns a vineyard. When young, he chooses how much to invest in his vineyard. The relation between the input of capital in period t and output in period t + 1 is given by a production function f ( ):
(1)
for any k t + u t > 0; k t is capital per worker, 0 k t 1 (since the capital stock can never exceed the available savings); g ( ) is an arbitrary function, g ( ) 0; u t is an i. This production function exhibits the standard feature of diminishing returns to capital with a positive …rst derivative and a negative second derivative,
where the subscript k refers to the partial derivative with respect to k. The logaritmic functional form has the advantage that it yields a closed-form solution for our model. Other functional forms, like the standard f (k t ; u t ) = (k t + u t ) , 2 (0; 1), would yield similar results, but no closed form solutions. Our production function is non-standard as it does not allow complementarity between labour and capital. With complementarity, investment of the current generation youngsters would have a positive external e¤ect on wages of the next generation. Leaving out this complementarity eliminates this e¤ect. The technology shock u t is additively capital augmenting:
u t is a perfect substitute for capital. Due to diminishing returns on capital, a higher u t reduces the return on capital for a given level of k t . A high value of u t therefore leads to an investment slump, a low value to an investment boom.
The crucial feature of this economy is that u t captures ex ante investment risk. Ex ante risk di¤ers from the standard ex post risk in that its realization is known at the moment the young decide on how much to invest in their vineyard.
Ex post risk is irrelevant in the current model with risk-neutrality. It will be introduced in Section 4, where we allow for risk aversion.
The function g (u t ) plays no role in the analysis. It has been added here merely to show that the model can handle di¤erent types of technology shocks.
Suppose g (u t ) = 0 for all u t . Then output is an increasing function of u t : an investment slump goes hand-in-hand with high levels of output. This is not the way we tend to think about investment slumps. We can deal with that by making g (u t ) a declining function of u t , such that investment and output are positively correlated. The only thing that matters for the analysis in this paper is the investment part of the story. Hence, for the sake of notational convenience, we set g (u t ) = 0, noting that we can generate any desired correlation between investment and output by a proper de…nition of g (u t ).
Since k t +u t > 0 must hold for ln (k t + u t ) to be de…ned, and since k t 2 [0; 1], we must impose some constraints on the support of u t . Since k t 1, a necessary condition is u t > 1, implying u > 1. For all equilibria considered in this paper the condition k t > u t is satis…ed. Since there is no growth in this economy, g = 0, the Aaron/Diamond condition for dynamic ine¢ ciency r < g reads r < 0. Since all capital is depleted in one period, the possibility of dynamic ine¢ ciency requires that if all savings are invested in the worst state of nature, k t = 1 and u t = u + , then the marginal return on capital must be less than one:
This motivates the following assumption on the upper and lower support of u t :
The latter assumption follows immediately from the …rst two, since the mean must be an interior point of the support. The parameter can therefore be interpreted as the average share of savings that should not be invested in vineyards to maintain dynamic e¢ ciency. If = 0, there is on average su¢ cient investment demand to absorb the supply of savings.
Our model does not allow for autocorrelation in u t . Allowing for autocorrelation is not di¢ cult in principle, but it would complicate the derivations without a¤ecting the main conclusions. We have not been explicit about the unit of time of our model, but the context of an overlapping generations model where people live for just two periods means that the appropriate unit of time is several decades. Then, the assumption of serial independence of subsequent values of u t does not pose a serious problem.
Since Say's law holds, the sum of the investment of the young in their vineyards, k t , and the consumption of the old, denoted c t , must be equal to the sum of savings and the return on last period's investment minus current investment:
Characterization of the equilibrium
Let p t be the price of gold in period t. In each period, members of the young generation must individually choose how much of their savings to invest in their vineyard, k t . What is left is spent on gold. The young take this decision so as to maximize their expected return in the second period, which satis…es:
where E t [x] denotes the expectation of x conditional on the information available at time t. The …rst-order condition for the optimal portfolio composition reads:
The expected return on gold should be equal to the marginal productivity of capital. Market clearing on the market for gold requires that the young buy the entire stock of gold from the old. Since the young spend 1 k t on gold and since the supply of gold is equal to unity, we have:
An equilibrium is a solution for p t and k t that satis…es the …rst-order condition (4) and the market-clearing condition (5).
Proposition 1 Equilibria for which E t [k t+1 ] does not depend on t.
1. There exists an equilibrium where k t = 1 and p t = 0 for all realizations of u t .
2. If:
then there exists a second equilibrium where:
3. If > 1=u + , then a similar equilibrium exists, but where investment is constrained by the non-negativity constraint k t 0 in some states of nature.
The proof of Proposition 1 is instructive, as the two equilibria follow naturally as two distinct roots of a second-order polynomial in expected investment,
Proof. Substitution of condition (5) into equation (4) yields:
(
Taking expectations conditional on the information available on t 1 yields:
E t 1 [k t ] does not depend on the realization of any of the past or future shocks u t .
] Using these results, equation (9) yields an expression for E t [k t+1 ]:
This equation has two solutions, E t [k t+1 ] = 1 and E t [k t+1 ] = 1 . The …rst equilibrium follows immediately from the …rst solution and equation (5). The second equilibrium follows from the substitution of E t [k t+1 ] = 1 in equation (8) and solving for k t . Substitution in equation (5) yields an expression for p t ,
proving equation (7). Consider this equation in detail. Since agents cannot be forced to sell their gold, the price of gold has to be positive in any state of nature. Hence: > 0. Furthermore, the following must hold: k t 2 [0; 1]. The upper constraint is satis…ed for all states of nature since u > 1 by equation
(2). The lower constraint requires < 1=u + . This proves condition (6).
Proposition 1 discusses two possible equilibria. In the …rst equilibrium, the young invest all of their savings in vineyards, even when this is dynamically ine¢ cient. Hence, the price of gold is zero. Nobody …nds it attractive to buy gold, since its expected price -and therefore its current price -is zero.
If equation (6) holds, there is a second equilibrium where people …nd it attractive to buy gold. We refer to this equilibrium as the bubbly equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the young do not want to invest all their savings in vineyards when the return on this investment is low. Instead, they buy gold as an alternative store of value. They do so because the expected price of gold is positive.
In equilibrium, the return on investment and the expected return on gold must be equal. When the return on capital is temporarily low, the price of gold is above its long-run equilibrium, since everybody wants to buy gold instead of investing in vineyards. Hence, the expected return on buying gold is also low, because people expect the price of gold to return to its long-run equilibrium,
], satisfying the return equivalence condition (4). The price of gold is a decreasing function of the investment in vineyards k t . Since the expected price of gold is …xed, the variation in the expected return on gold is driven by variation in its current price.
The price of gold can never be zero in a bubbly equilibrium, since then the expected return would be in…nite, which is inconsistent with the return equivalence condition (4). Hence, even in an extreme investment boom, u t = u , not all saving is spent on productive investment, even though the return exceeds unity. This is also the reason why condition (6), > 0, is stricter than condition
(2), u + > 0. Condition (2) only guarantees that there are some states of nature where investing all savings in vineyards is ine¢ cient. Condition (6) requires that investmenting all savings in vineyards is ine¢ cient for the "average" state of nature. If not, the prospect of an investment slump would not be su¢ ciently severe for youngsters to buy gold even in the best state of nature. 1 In what follows, we assume condition (6) to apply. 2 1 Condition (6) also imposes < 1=u + . If this condition is violated, a bubbly equilibrium exists, but investment is bound by the non-negativity constraint kt 0 in some states of nature. Then all savings are spent on gold, leading to a messier description of the equilibrium.
Hence, we omit it. Note that the upperbound kt 1 is never binding, since the young always spend some savings on gold. 2 Since < u + , the condition < u + 1 implies < 1.
Ex ante risk in investment leads to ex post risk in the price of gold in a bubbly equilibrium: even though the current return on investment is known, the return on gold is uncertain, due to uncertainty about the future return on investment.
Proposition 1 focusses on equilibria where E t [k t+1 ] is constant over time.
There are other equilibria, where E t [k t+1 ] varies over time, see e.g. Tirole (1985) for a discussion in the context of a deterministic equilibrium. There are sunspot equilibria and there are asymptotically bubbleless equilibria, where r < g. Then, the no arbitrage condition implies that the value of bubble declines gradually. A similar asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium can be expected to exist in this stochastic economy with random shocks to the product of capital.
In that case, E t [k t+1 ] would gradually increase over time towards unity. This type of equilibrium is not essential for the argument on …scal policy in the next section. Hence, I do not discuss them here.
We refer to the …rst equilibrium as the naive equilibrium, because it is unlikely that agents coordinate on this equilibrium when the bubbly equilibrium exists. As soon as we enter a bubbly world, where the expected price of gold is positive, E t [p t+1 ] > 0, each individual agent is strictly worse o¤ by not buying gold up till the point where the expected return on gold is equal to the return to investment in vineyards. Buying gold is therefore a rational decision even when everybody is aware that it is a bubbly asset. For this reason, an asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium is hard to justify. If we start to coordinate on believes that bubbly assets carry value in the …rst place, then why would we believe that the value of these assets will gradually decline? This holds a fortiori because bubbles satisfy a real demand for store of value during investment slumps.
Thereby, they further e¢ ciency, see Proposition 3 below. When bubbles vanish asymptotically, so would the e¢ ciency gain. Tirole (1985) shows that in a deterministic model, bubbles can only be sustained when r = g. Does this condition carry over to the stochastic model considered in this paper? Since the return on capital varies over time, we have to account for this variability. Hence, we investigate whether the expected re-turn on capital satis…es this condition. Similarly, Abel et.al. (1987) show that permanent bubbles and permanent dynamic ine¢ ciency would require the capital sector to be a net sink: investment should exceed capital outlays. The subsequent proposition shows that the expected return on capital is positive, r > g, and that the capital sector has on average net positive outlays.
Proposition 2 The expected return on capital.
1. E f 1 kt = 1:
where f kt f k (k t ; u t ).
Proof. The …rst statement follows directly from equation (4); the second from Jensen's inequality:
The …rst term is positive, by Jensen's inequality; the second term is also positive, since both stochasts depend negatively on u t .
Proposition 2 that bubbles can only be sustained when r = g, we conclude that the existence of bubbly assets guarantees that "on average" r > g.
Welfare comparison
An analysis of the implication of bubbles for welfare requires the de…nition of a proper criterion. The de…nition of welfare that we apply is expected utility of the young before the veil of ignorance about the ex ante risk u t is lifted: that is, before the youngsters learn what prospects for productive investment their cohort faces. Since the consumption of the young is …xed, the …rst-best policy maximizes expected consumption of the elderly. Since we have no instruments to transfer wealth between periods other than investment in vineyards, the only decision we have to take is how much of the output generated in a particular period should be invested in vineyards and how much should consumed by the elderly. Since the former favours the young while the latter favours the elderly, any change in the allocation implies a transfer of wealth between generations.
Since the …rst-best investment rule k
Note that both k t and k t 1 enter equation (3), which depends on di¤erent realizations of the technology shock, u t and u t 1 respectively. However, the rule k (u) should apply likewise to both k t and k t 1 . Since both terms enter additively, we can take expectations for each term separately and add up the expectations. This makes this formulation of the …rst-best policy applicable. 3
The …rst-order condition implies k (u t ) = 1 u t :
Since 0 k (u t ) 1, this condition applies unconstrained in all states of nature only if 0 u < u + 1. This is a more stringent constraint than equations
(2) and (6). Again, dealing with the truncations at k (u) = 0 and k (u) = 1 is straightforward in principle, but it messes up notation and provides no new insights. Hence, we assume that this more stringent condition holds. Furthermore, 3 A more formal treatment would observe that the accumulated welfare of all future gener-
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to kt yields the same expression. The problem with this speci…cation is that 1 t=0 E[ct] does not converge. One could interpret this speci…cation as the limiting case for the discount rate going to zero.
we assume that for any increasing function h
The consumption c t that goes with this investment rule, see equation (3), depends on the investment opportunities of the young. This outcome is similar to a form of intergenerational insurance of the return on capital. If a generation faces a low marginal return on investment due to a high realization of u t , then the current generation of the elderly absorbs the excess saving by consuming their windfall pro…t on bubbly assets. The young bene…t indirectly from this obligation to hand over part of their savings to the current elderly without proper compensation, because the same rule that forces them to do so in this period, will apply also next period, when they are the potential bene…ciaries. The …rstbest allocation can therefore be implemented by an optimal Rawlsian insurance policy that insures the young against the risk of a low return on productive investment agreed upon before the veil of ignorance is lifted. Insurance pays o¤ even in this world with risk-neutral agents, since it allows agents to avoid having to make investments in vineyards when this is ine¢ cient.
The bubbly equilibrium is a compromise between the naive market equilibrium and the …rst-best allocation: the coe¢ cient on u t in the expression for k t is equal to zero in the naive equilibrium and equal to unity in the …rst-best equilibrium, while it is in between zero and unity in the bubbly equilibrium, 0 < 1+ < 1, see Proposition 1. Relative to the Rawlsian insurance policy, the bubbly equilibrium provides partial insurance. If a generation faces a low marginal return on capital, it invests less in its vineyards and spends more on bubbly assets. This reduces the volatility in the return on capital, but does not eliminate it. Full stabilization requires that k t varies more. Then, the marketclearing condition p t = 1 k t implies that the price of gold should vary. Since the expected return on gold varies inversely to the price of gold, and since this return is equal to that on capital, this implies that the return on capital must vary. It is therefore less volatile than in the naive market equilibrium, but more volatile than in the …rst-best allocation, where the return on capital is constant, f kt = 1.
A peak in gold prices leads to a boost in the consumption of the elderly.
Fluctuations in gold prices are therefore a means for adjusting the consumption of the elderly to the level of productive investment set by youngsters. When investment of the young is high, consumption of the elderly should be low, and the other way around. One would expect that this type of intergenerational transfer could not be implemented without enforcement by the government. However,
bubbles are a substitute. The desire of the young to avoid unproductive investment by buying gold as an alternative store of value provides an enforcement mechanism for a partial implicit insurance contract. The market provides a second-best substitute for government-enforced intergenerational transfers in a bubbly equilibrium that is not available in the naive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The trade-o¤ between expected welfare and its variability.
1. The naive equilibrium yields the highest mean level of investment; mean investment is the same in the …rst-best and the bubbly equilibrium.
2. First best yields the highest expected welfare and the naive equilibrium the lowest.
3. The ordering of the variability of welfare is the same.
Proof. Remember that expected consumption of the elderly is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare. Hence, we can use the expressions for E[c t ] and Var[c t ] to prove the …rst two statements. Using equation (3), Proposition 1 and equation (10), one can derive the expressions presented in Table 1 . Some simple calculations using these expressions prove the proposition. 
There is a trade-o¤ between expected welfare and its variability. Agents are risk-neutral, so the variability does not come at a price in this economy. This will change when we allow for risk aversion in Section 4. The sources of variation di¤er between equilibria. In the naive market equilibrium, the variation comes from the return on capital. In the …rst-best equilibrium, the variation comes from the investment in vineyards. The variation in the bubbly equilibrium is a mixture of both. Investment is the highest in the naive market equilibrium, since in that equilibrium agents have no alternative store of value. Remarkably, average investment is the same in the bubbly and the …rst-best equilibrium, though investment is more volatile in the …rst-best equilibrium. Hence, the bubbly equilibrium features overinvestment when the return on capital is low and underinvestment when the return is high.
3 Intertemporal substitution in consumption
Assumptions
The model of Section 2 constrained the problem to the allocation of current saving to either investment in vineyards (to the bene…t of the young) or consumption (to the bene…t of the elderly). In practice, consumption can be transferred between stages of life. This section introduces a trade-o¤ for the young between consumption now and saving for future consumption. To …x ideas, suppose that agents are characterized by Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences with risk-neutrality within each period and Cobb Douglas preferences for intertemporal substitution:
where c y t is the consumption of the young cohort entering the economy at t and c t+1 is their consumption when they have grown old at t+1. The parameter is the budget share of consumption in the second period, 0 < < 1. Epstein-Zin preferences decouple the rate of intertemporal substitution from the degree of risk aversion. This section maintains the assumption of risk-neutrality.
The Cobb Douglas structure for intertemporal substitution implies that income and substitution e¤ects cancel, so that variations in the (expected) return on capital do not a¤ect the budget share that the young set apart for future consumption. Total labour income earned in the …rst period of life is conveniently assumed to be equal to 1 , so that savings are equal to unity in a market equilibrium, in both the naive and the bubbly equilibrium, as in the previous section.
We can achieve an analytical solution only by using a simpli…cation compared to most of the literature. In an economy with constant returns to scale, the investment in capital by the previous generation yields a positive externality to the wage rate faced by the next generation. This externality is equal to the di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-marginal return to capital.
It introduces a source of persistence: higher investment today yields higher wages and hence higher savings next period. Our production function rules out complementarity between labour and capital, but this raises the issue what happens to the di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-marginal return to capital. Here, we introduce a separate class of rentiers, who own the vineyards and consume all the rents derived from their property, but who play no further role in the economy. We assume that there is no market for vineyards.
Capital productivity is modelled in the same way as in the previous section, except that vineyards are owned not by the population at large, but by a separate class of rentiers. The di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-
is the income of the rentier class, which plays no further role in the analysis.
Fiscal policy
Since income and substitution e¤ects cancel in the intertemporal trade-o¤ of youngsters, the naive and the bubbly equilibrium are exactly the same as in the previous section, apart from the di¤erence due to the introduction of a separate rentier class. However, the extension of the model with intertemporal substitution in consumption allows us to study the e¤ect of …scal policy. We consider a simple policy rule, where the government issues bonds at time t that pay back one unit of consumption per bond at time t + 1. The government commits to issue b bonds of this type each period. It sells them at a price q t ,
which di¤ers between periods. Hence, the interest rate is equal to q 1 t 1. Each period, the government has to repay its debt b, but it receives bq t from new bond issuance. The di¤erence between the two is covered by a tax z t on labour income (or: subsidy, if q t > 1), which satis…es
Lifetime wealth is equal to gross labour income 1 minus the tax on labour income. Hence, agents consume an amount 1 (1 z t ) when young and save an amount 1 z t for future consumption. Hence, expected consumption of the elderly at time t + 1 evaluated at time t satis…es
where s and g are the shares of savings held in investment and gold, respectively.
represents the savings set apart for consumption in the second period; R t + 1
measures the return on that savings. The young choose the composition of their portfolio as to maximize R t (g; s):
The …rst-order conditions of this problem require the expected return on the three available assets to be equal:
Market clearing requires investment k t to be equal to its share s t in total savings, and likewise for bonds and gold, implying
where equation (12) is substituted for z t and where (1 ) b and 0 = (1 ). An equilibrium is a quintuple g t ; s t ; p t ; k t , and q t that solves equation (15) and the market-clearing conditions (16).
Proposition 4 The e¤ ect of …scal policy in the bubbly equilibrium.
1. A bubbly equilibrium exists when b .
2. The expected price of gold p t is b; the expected price of bonds q t is unity.
3. The expected level of investment k t is 1 and hence does not depend on b.
4. Investment and the price of gold are less variable for a higher b, the prices of gold and bonds are more volatile for a higher b. 5 5. Expected utility before lifting the veil of ignorance about u t reaches a max-
Proof. see Appendix.
Bubbles cease to exist when b , see Statement 1. Since the expected level of investment is 1 , the expected demand for stores of value is equal to . Hence, the demand for gold vanishes when the government absorbs the excess supply of saving by issuing bonds. Furthermore, the price of gold must be positive even for the highest investment demand, u t = u , yielding a constraint on u .
Statement 2 says that any savings absorbed by …scal policy leads to an equal reduction in the expected price of gold. Statement 3 states that the average level of investment in a bubbly equilibrium is equal to the …rst-best, irrespective of the level of b, compare this with Statement 1 of Proposition 3. However, investment is less sensitive to shocks to the return on investment, the more so the higher b, see Statement 4. Hence, this simple …scal policy drives investment away from …rst-best compared to the bubbly equilibrium without …scal policy. The reason is that bonds have a …xed pay out, while the future price of gold varies according to the state of investment demand. Hence, bubbly assets are better suited to accommodate variation in investment demand.
Nevertheless, this simple policy improves welfare compared to the equilibrium without …scal policy, see Statement 5. The reason is that …scal policy allows transferring consumption between the two stages of life. This cannot be achieved in a bubbly equilibrium without …scal policy, since the young always consume a share 1 of their lifetime wealth. Hence, when lifetime wealth is constant, so will be consumption in the …rst stage of life. Only the elderly adjust their consumption in response to an investment boom or a slump, by the same mechanism as in the economy without intertemporal substitution. When the government conducts …scal policy, the young share in the absorption of shocks in total consumption. This is achieved by changing the lifetime wealth of the young. When investment is low due to a low return on capital, demand for government bonds is high, leading to a high price of bonds and hence a low interest rate. Hence, taxes z t will be negative, which raises lifetime wealth and hence consumption of the young. This increase does not a¤ect their consumption when retired, due to the fall in the return on bonds. Stated di¤erently, …scal policy uses the income e¤ect of negative taxes to boost current consumption during an investment slump and the substitution e¤ect of a low interest rate to o¤set the income e¤ect in the second stage of life. Fiscal policy is therefore most e¤ective when the share of consumption during retirement is small. The smaller , the less attractive it is to let all shocks in consumption be absorbed by the elderly. Hence, there is a larger role for …scal policy to shift consumption between the stages of life. Contrary to the standard view of …scal policy dealing with inter generational transfers, …scal policy implements intragenerational transfers of consumption in this world, while trade in bubbly assets implements the inter generational transfers. When 1 < (that is, for a high average level of ine¢ ciency ), welfare is maximized by some combination of both institutions.
If the average level of ine¢ ciency is low, welfare is maximized by putting the full burden of adjustment on the young. Since (the share of the consumption when retired in lifetime wealth) is of the order of magnitude of 0.25, the average level of ine¢ ciency must be quite high for the former to be optimal. Hence, it is quite likely that …scal policy alone should do the job in this world. Sovereign debt would be su¢ ciently high in that case to prevent bubbles emerging. Note also that at the critical transition 1 = , the relation between the optimal level of b and changes sign. For lower levels of ine¢ ciency, a higher value of increases the optimal value of b (which is , in that case). However, as long as 1 < , a greater degree of expected dynamic ine¢ ciency, going up, should lead to a higher level of sovereign debt.
The …scal policy considered here applies an income tax to cover the de…cits or surpluses from the government's debt operations. Hence, only the young pay taxes or receive subsidies. One could generalize this policy by allowing for a combination of income and consumption taxes, thereby spreading the tax burden between the young and the elderly. A proper combination of income and consumption taxes could implement the same equilibrium as is implemented by a combination of income taxes and bubbly assets. Such a combination of income and consumption taxes is a substitute for bubbly assets.
Even when such a combination of income and consumption taxes is available, the type of …scal policy considered here is quite simple, since we constrain b to be constant over time. Would more complicated policy rules allow for a further improvement of welfare? The answer is de…nitely yes. One can show that a …rst-best allocation would require more complicated investment and consumption rules, which depend not only on u t , but also on k t 1 and u t 1 . A more complicated and activist …scal policy would therefore improve welfare beyond the constrained optimum considered in Proposition 4. We do not present this …rst-best allocation here, since it has no analytical solution and is therefore hard to characterize, while it contributes little to understanding the relevant mechanisms.
Statements 2 and 4 say that …scal policy stabilizes …nancial markets in the sense that it reduces both the average price of gold and its variability in absolute terms; in relative terms, the variability of the price of gold increases. There is less demand for gold as a store of value since sovereign debt serves as a substitute. The only di¤erence between gold and government bonds is that the return on gold is risky (since its future price depends on the future return on capital), while the return on bonds is …xed. However, since agents are riskneutral in this economy, this di¤erence is irrelevant here. This will change when we introduce risk aversion.
4 Risk aversion and the risk-free rate
Assumptions
This section relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality, while maintaining the Cobb Douglas structure for intertemporal substitution:
The parameter is the degree of relative risk aversion. For = 1, the utility function simpli…es to
In that case, we are back in the standard expected utility framework.
Thus far, the riskiness of the investment in vineyards has been irrelevant.
Under risk-neutrality, the only thing that mattered was ex ante risk. Since the realization of this factor is known at the moment of investment, the investment itself is risk-free in an economy with only this type of risk. However, investment is risky in reality. In an economy with risk aversion, this uncertainty should be taken into account. We therefore extend the production function with an additional random variable accounting for ex post risk:
. v t+1 and u t are independent by construction: v t+1 captures the new information that is coming in at t + 1. If that information were to be correlated to u t , u t would contain information about the future value of v t+1 , and hence v t+1 would not be news. 6 The more substantive assumption is that u t and v t are uncorrelated. One would surmise that the expected return on future investment is correlated to the realized return on current investment.
Allowing for this correlation is straightforward in principle, but would mess up subsequent derivations. Hence, it is ruled out by assumption. The production function implies
where f kt f k (k t ; u t ; v t+1 ): the marginal productivity of capital. Note that
Fiscal policy is the same as in the previous section. 6 Strictly, this argument would apply only when ut and vt would enter additively: f ( ) = ln (kt + ut + v t+1 ). Up to a second-order term, this speci…cation is identical to the speci…cation in the text. The latter speci…cation is somewhat more convenient in the subsequent analysis.
Characterization of the equilibrium
As in the model with risk-neutrality, youngsters save 1 z t for consumption in the second stage of life. Hence, equation (13) for c t+1 applies. Agents choose g t and s t as to maximize E t h c 1 t+1 i 1=(1 ) . Since we can factor out E t [(1 z t ) ] =
(1 z t ) and since only R t depends on g t and s t , the problem can be written as g t ; s t = arg max
An equilibrium is a quintuple g t ; s t ; p t ; k t , and q t that solves equation (19) and the market-clearing conditions (16).
Since a full characterization of this equilibrium is too di¢ cult a task, due to the non-linearity of equation (19) (compare the linearity of equation 14), we take a step back. We approximate the optimal portfolio for small deviations of u t and v t from their expected value. In particular, we assume
= h 0 ;
where we consider the equilibrium for the limiting case of the standard deviations of u t and v t being small: lim h ! 0. Hence: u t = O (h) and v t = O (h).
The following proposition allows a Taylor approximation of the market returns to the assets.
Proposition 5 The return equivalence conditions in the bubbly equilibrium read
where the symbol = implies that terms of O h 3 are ignored and where k
(1 ) 2 , p ( b) 2 2 , and (1 b + ) 1 ; d =db > 0 and d p =db < 0.
The approximation applied in Proposition 5 accounts for the e¤ect of realizations of the ex ante and ex post risk factors u t and v t on the composition of the asset portfolio of the young, and hence for the e¤ect of these risk factors on asset prices. This e¤ect is of order h. The approximation also accounts for the e¤ects of the average portfolio composition on risk premia and utility, which are e¤ects of order h 2 . The approximation ignores the e¤ect of deviations from the average portfolio on utility due to the realization of u t and v t . Since deviations are of order h and have a utility cost of order h 2 , this e¤ect is of order h 3 . The intuition is that the average portfolio balances the utility cost of these risks on average, so that deviations have a higher-order e¤ect.
Equation (21) generalizes the return equivalence conditions (15) for the case of risk aversion. The inverse risk-free rate q t minus the inverse of expected rate of return on risky assets (either productive investments or gold) is equal to the risk premia on holding either of these assets ( k and p respectively). Since the expected rate of return on gold is equal to the growth rate of the economy -which is zero-the risk premium on holding gold implies that the expected return on bonds is negative. This negative return is the premium for insurance against future ex ante risk u t . While the risk premium on investment k does not depend on the …scal policy parameter b, the risk premium on the bubbly asset p is decreasing in b. When the government absorbs a larger share of savings, it has to pay a higher interest rate on its bonds (or equivalently, the price of bonds will be lower).
An approximate equilibrium is the solution for k t ; p t ; and q t to the asset return equations (21) and the market-clearing condition (16) for p t . The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Risk aversion and …scal policy. 2. This equilibrium satis…es:
3. The expected level of investment is lower for higher b.
4. The expected price of gold and of bonds is lower for higher b.
5. Investment and the price of gold are less variable for a higher b; the prices of gold and bonds are more volatile for a higher b.
6. The higher the degree of risk aversion , the stronger the e¤ ect of …scal policy on utility when measured at b = 0: dU db jb=0 is increasing in .
For = 0 this approximate equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium considered in Proposition 4, compare equation (22) to equation (23) in the Appendix.
The expected value of investment deviates from that in the risk-neutral economy, depending on which has the higher risk premium: gold or investment in vineyards. When ex ante risk dominates, risk aversion leads to higher investment, since the alternative of holding gold is more risky. Bonds and gold are close substitutes, apart from the fact that gold is a risky asset due to next period's ex ante risk. Fiscal policy has a negative e¤ect on the price of gold: when sovereign debt acts as an alternative store of value, the average demand for gold goes down. However, this initial e¤ect is partly o¤set by a reduction in the risk premium p on holding gold, since …scal policy stabilizes the price of gold.
The introduction of a simple …scal policy dampens the variability of investment and the price of gold. However, …scal policy is a less e¤ective means of shifting resources between investment and consumption than trade in bubbly assets. Hence, investment is less responsive to variations in its return. The price of gold is less variable because government bonds are available as an alternative store of value. Risk aversion increases the marginal e¤ect of …scal policy on utility because it provides better insurance for the young, since part of the adjustment in the balance between consumption and investment is spread between the two stages of life.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed a world where bubbles are a means for implementing intergenerational transfers to accommodate temporary ‡uctuations in the return on capital. Bubbly assets serve as an alternative store of value in the presence of dynamic ine¢ ciency. Despite these temporary episodes of dynamic ine¢ ciency, capital is productive on average, in the sense that average outlays of the capital sector exceed in ‡ow, a criterion very similar to that derived by Abel et.al. (1987) . In this world, a simple …scal policy stabilizes the economy where the government issues a …xed quantity bonds with a …xed future pay out. These bonds serve as an alternative store of value during investment slumps, thereby providing an instrument for intragenerational transfers and reducing the price of bubbly assets. Variation in the price of these bonds provides a means for adjusting consumption to investment demand. Remarkably, trade in bubbly assets shifts resources between investment and consumption by inter generational transfers, while …scal policy does this by intragenerational transfers, shifting resources over the lifecycle between current and future consumption. These results counter the conventional wisdom that only the government can enforce
inter generational transfers and that …scal policy is the means to implement these transfers. For reasonable parameter values, this simple model predicts that welfare is maximized by letting sovereign debt absorb on average all excess saving, thereby preventing the emergence of bubbles.
Our analysis applies a Cobb Douglas intertemporal utility function, implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to one. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity, as is usually found empirically, the e¤ect of investment slumps becomes even stronger. A fall in the return
Substitution of these expression in the second equality of equation (15) yields
This equation shows that k t depends on u t and E t [k t+1 ] only. Hence, equation (??) applies. Taking expectation in the …nal equation yields:
This equation has two solutions. The solution that sets the …rst factor equal to zero corresponds to the naive equilibrium. We focus on the second solution corresponding to the bubbly equilibrium:
Some calculation yields expressions for investment and the prices of bonds and gold:
where 0 1 b; p t should be positive for any state of nature for an equilibrium to exist, proving statement 1. The expected prices of bonds and gold follow immediately:
proving statements 2 and 3. Statement 4 follows from equation (23).
Consumption for the young and the elderly satis…es the following:
Substitution in expected welfare yields:
The …rst-order condition for the optimal value of b implies 
Proof of proposition 5
Conjecture 7 There is an equilibrium with the following properties:
1. q t 1 = O (h)
) q 1 t 1 = O (h) ; z t = b (1 q t ) = O (h); see equation (12).
The strategy of the proof is to apply the conjecture to derive the equilibrium and then show that this equilibrium satis…es the conjecture. ]. Note that both 2 and 2 are O h 2 so that we can ignore any higher-order terms.
The …rst-order conditions for g t and s t read as follows
where R t R t (g t ; s t ). By the Conjecture, the market-clearing conditions (16) can be written as
Substitution of equation (27) (21).
Equations (16) (that for p t ) and (21) is a system of three linear equations with three unknowns: k t ; p t ; and q t . The solution to this system reads as follows: 
The …nal equation is consistent with = ( 0 + ) 1 . This con…rms the conjecture used for deriving equation (21).
Proposition 6
Substitution of the value for in equation (29) yields equation (22). Statements 1-4 follow immediately.
Expectation and variance of q t : Equation (22) implies the following:
E [1 z t ] = 1 + b p ; Var [1 z t ] = 2 b 2 2 2 :
Expectation and variance of R t : Substituting equation (28) (see equation (18) and the Conjecture) yields:
(1 ) k + ( b) p = O h 2 ;
using p = O h 2 and k = O h 2 in the third line. Hence The most unfavorable case is = = 1. Even in that case, the second term is positive. This proves statement 7.
Lemma 9
d db 1 0
For b = 0 and dividing by 2 (1 ) 
